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1. Lewis's problem about permission
This  paper  presents  a  solution  to  David Lewis's  “problem about  permission”  outlined  in  his
(1975). That problem makes best sense against the background of a certain general theory about
conversational  pragmatics  that  is  due  to  Stalnaker  (1978) and  Lewis  (1979) and  has  been
subsequently  developed  by many others. In this section, I briefly sketch this background, and
Lewis's problem. The following two sections of this paper describe a solution.
The background is this: at any time, any conversation has a state, and the effect of a participant's
contribution  is  to  change  that  state,  in  a  way  that  depends  both  on  the  initial  state  of  the
conversation  and  on  the  force  and  content  of  what  is  said.  One  aspect  of  the  state  of  a
conversation is what is presupposed in that conversation at that time, and this is often modeled
by a set of possible worlds1 called the context set or presupposition set. The most studied kind of
contribution to a conversation is assertion, which is what normally happens when a participant
utters a declarative sentence in a conversation. The characteristic effect of an assertion is to make
the  content  asserted  presupposed,  and  that  happens  in  the  following  way.  Suppose  that  the
content of a declarative sentence is the set of worlds at which that sentence is true. The effect of
asserting that sentence is to shrink the context set by removing from it all worlds that which the
sentence is false (i.e. the new context set is the intersection  of the old with the content asserted).2
For example, if in some conversation, I say “It will rain on Tuesday”, and no-one objects, then
all worlds at which it does not rain on Tuesday are removed from the context set. In the new state
of the conversation it rains on Tuesday in every world in the context set, so the effect of my
contribution has been to make it presupposed that it will rain on Tuesday.
This conception of assertions goes with a certain picture of the purpose of assertion,  and of
conversation in general. As social creatures endowed with a belief-desire psychology, it is of
benefit to humans to share our doxastic resources. Conversation accomplishes this by giving us a
method for pooling and coordinating our beliefs.
Lewis's problem grows from an attempt to generalise this kind of account to include imperative
sentences, as well as declaratives. Where declaratives are used to make assertions, imperatives
1 We should not get too hung up on what the members of a context set are. I will call them “worlds” throughout, 
but for some applications, it may be better to regard them as part of worlds, tuples of a world, a position, a time 
and a speaker, or tuples of any of the above. All that matters is that these items carry enough information to map
the content of any declarative sentence to a truth value.
2 Actually, there's a bit more to it than that – for an assertion to have its effect, the other speakers must accept it; 
and we should also take into account the effects of any conventional implicatures of the sentence asserted. But 
this cartoon view will suffice for our purposes.
are used to make commands. Closely connected with imperatives and commands are permissives
– sentences such as “You may take the day off.”, where this is construed not as an assertion
concerning what you are permitted to do, but as an act of permission that brings it about that you
are permitted to do something.1
Imperatives  are  often  regarded  as  analogous  to  declaratives  in  the  following  way.  Where
declaratives  may be true  or  false;  imperatives  may be complied  with or  not  complied  with.
Where the content of a declarative may be regarded as its truth-conditions (i.e. the set of worlds
at which it is true)  the content of an imperative may be regarded as its compliance-conditions
(the set of worlds at which it is complied with).
This suggests an analogy with the concepts of presupposition, context set, and assertion. One of
aspect of the state of a conversation is what is commanded within that conversation. This can be
modelled by the set of worlds in which all that is commanded within the conversation comes
about  (or  to  put  it  another,  in  which nothing that  is  impermissible  comes  about);  following
Lewis, let us call this set the sphere of permissibility. The characteristic effect of an imperative is
to make its content commanded, and that comes about in the following way: commanding an
imperatives shrinks the sphere of permissibility in a way analogous to the way that an assertion
shrinks the presupposition set. If I say “Work all day on Tuesday”and you do not object, then all
worlds  at  which  you  do  not  work  all  day  on  Tuesday  are  removed  from  the  sphere  of
permissibility. Subsequently no world in which you do not work all day on Tuesday can be a
world at which all that is commanded within our conversation comes about – i.e. the content of
my imperative has been commanded within our conversation.2
So far so good.  But what  about permissives,  such as “you may take Tuesday off”? Well, if an
imperative  shrinks  the  sphere  of  permissibility  in  a  way  dependent  on  the  content  of  that
imperative, making what was previously permissible impermissible, then by parity of reasoning,
a  permissive  should  expand  the  sphere,  making,  or  ensuring  that,  something  is  permissible.
Lewis's problem about permission consists in a failed search for a method of expanding the
sphere of permissibility in response to an arbitrary permissive.
To see why it's hard, consider  the most obvious approach. Let the effect of a permissive be to
make  the  new sphere  of  permissibility  the  union of  the  old  sphere  with  the  content  of  the
permissive (giving permissives and imperatives a pleasing set-theoretic duality). So, for example,
the effect of “You may take Tuesday off” is to add all the possible worlds at which you take
Tuesday off to the sphere of permissibility. The problem with this is that it expands the sphere
way too much to be plausible. Among the worlds in which you take Tuesday off are worlds in
which you do all manner of things, including worlds in which you fail to comply with all kinds
of commands that  we would normally see as consistent  with the permissive  “You may take
1 It's a characteristic feature of Lewis's own version of this theory that he doubts the distinction I have just drawn 
between a speech  act of Xing and an assertion concerning what one has Xed (for X in “permit”, “command”, 
“name aftered a dictator”, etc). I'm a defender of the mainstream speech act theoretic tradition against Lewis on 
that point (Parsons 2012) but it doesn't matter to the material under discussion here. 
2 Lewis (1975) is the locus classicus of this conversational analysis of imperatives. For my own version of it, see 
(Parsons 2013, sec. 3.5).
Tuesday off”. For example, suppose that you are currently commanded not to kill me under any
circumstances (perhaps I have just said “Don't kill me under any circumstances!”); among the
worlds in which you take Tuesday off are worlds in which you kill me (on Tuesday perhaps, or
even on any other day). So, on this view my, telling you to take Tuesday off has the effect of
revoking the unrelated command not to kill me! In general, it has the effect of revoking every
command the non-compliance with which is consistent with your taking the day off on Tuesday.
That is absurd; so by reductio, permissives do not expand the sphere of permissibility in the way
described.
Lewis considers and rejects several alternatives to the simple “permission as union” approach
described above. I won't go into the details, as I couldn't possibly present the arguments any
more clearly than he does. I will present an alternative conversational approach to permissives on
which they do not expand the sphere of permissibility at all.
Before I proceed to that, a word about Lewis's examples. Lewis sets up his example by talking
about an idealized conversational setting involving three characters: Master, Slave, and Kibitzer.
Master gives Slave commands, and Slave always accepts them. Kibitzer can talk to Master and
Slave about what Slave is commanded to do. The advantage of this setup is that it idealizes away
from issues about Master's authority to give commands (he is assumed to have it) and Slave's
willingness to accept them (he always does). But it has the disadvantage of giving us a distorted
and  narrow  picture  of  the  role  of  imperatives  and  permissives  in  natural  conversations.
Imperatives are not always used to make military-style commands, which if issued by someone
in  authority,  must  be  obeyed  on  pain  of  sanction.  I  prefer  to  the  think  of  imperatives  and
permissives as a means of pooling and coordinating our intentions and plans in an analogous way
to the way that declaratives allow us share our belief.
...I would prefer to think of the language game in a more symmetrical way - rather than as a
game of commanding in a narrow military sense, as a game of coordinating shared intentions
(analogous to the assertion game of coordinating shared beliefs). Refer to simplified language
game with Authority and Gullible.
2. A solution.
The solution I propose is not a straight one. I begin by supposing that Lewis has not overlooked
any plausible recipe for expanding the sphere of permissibility – that in fact there is no plausible
recipe for so expanding the sphere that takes as input only the content of a permissive.  Lewis's
problem started from a false premise – the illocutionary effect of a permissive is not to expand
the sphere of permissibility.
What is it then? My suggestion is that permissives have no illocutionary effect on the sphere of
permissibility at all; rather, their only function is to  fail if  they are inconsistent with what is
currently permitted. By “fail” here, I mean what normally happens when an imperative is uttered
which  is  inconsistent  with the  current  sphere  of  permissibility  (or,  for  that  matter,  when an
assertion is  made that  is  inconsistent  with what  is  currently presupposed).  We can think,  as
before, of the content of a permissive as a set of possible worlds (e.g. the content of “You may
take Tuesday off” is the set of worlds in which you take Tuesday off); but the illocutionary effect
of the permissive is not to add those worlds to the sphere of permissibility – it is to fail if those
worlds are disjoint with the sphere of permissibility.
The effect of a permissive is thus similar to, but strictly weaker than, the effect of an imperative
with the same content. The imperative “Take Tuesday off!” has as its content the set of worlds in
which you take  Tuesday off  (the same as the content of “You may take Tuesday off”) and its
effect is make the sphere of permissibility shrink to be the intersection of that set with the current
sphere of permissibility. If the result is the empty set (that is, if the content is disjoint with the
current sphere of permissibility) then it must fail because what is being commanded is already
impermissible. The effect of the permissive is exactly like this, except that it doesn't shrink the
sphere.
It seems to me that permissives stand to imperatives as epistemic modals stand to declaratives.
An ordinary assertion, such as “It will rain each day this week” shrinks the context set in such a
way that it becomes presupposed that it will rain each day this week. An epistemic modal, such
as “It might not rain on Tuesday”, seems to somehow have a reverse effect, ensuring that it is not
presupposed that it will rain on Tuesday. The analogue of my suggestion about permissives is
that an epistemic modal does not effect the context set, but fails if its content is disjoint with the
current context set. Thus “It might not rain on Tuesday” fails unless the context set contains at
least one world in which it rains on Tuesday.
How does this solve the problem?
It's not yet clear how the theory suggested above solves Lewis's problem. Let's just think about
what it predicts.  Suppose that, starting in a conversational state in which Slave is required to
work each day,  Master  says  “You may take Tuesday off”.  On my view, Master  has simply
contradicted  himself  (or,  more  carefully,  what  he  has  done  is  the  imperatival  analogue  of
asserting  something  that  contradicts  the  existing  presuppositions  of  the  conversation).  That
places the conversation in an inconsistent state (not, contra Lewis's assumptions, a state in which
it is permitted that Slave take Tuesday off).
This  is  however,  no  disaster  –  conversations  can  end  up  in  an  inconsistent  state  easily.
Participants  change their  minds,  or  realize that  they'd  allowed something  to  be  presupposed
earlier  that  they  hadn't  realized  was  inconsistent  with  something  else  that  they  or  other
participants  believe.  What  generally  happens  in  these  circumstances  is  what  we  may  call
“backtracking”: participants try to find an earlier state of the conversation that is consistent from
which they can continue without reaching the inconsistency. It is the this backtracking process, I
claim, that is responsible for setting the conversational state to a state in which Slave is not
required to work on Tuesday.
I'll say more about the mechanism of backtracking later. For now, I note that this escapes Lewis's
problem  because  it  does  not  involve  any  general  procedure  for  expanding  the  sphere  of
permissibility that takes as input the content of a permissive.  Permissives don't do that – the
sphere expands not (directly) because of the permissive, but because the conversational state has
become inconsistent. There is no general procedure for backtracking – participants must simply
do as best they can in the circumstances.
… refer to answer 4?
3 further morals:
DKL's problem could occur without a permissive. Suppose master says "tomorrow, take the day
off!"  Note that Lewis conceives of this situation differently:  he thinks that Master must have
implicitly permitted Slave to take the day off before commanding him to do so, in order to avoid
contradiction!
Or without imperatival speech acts of any kind. Suppose Authority says to Gullible "It will not
rain this week" and later "It is going to rain on Tuesday".
Permissives seem analogous to epistemic modals. Lewis's original case is analogous to Authority
saying to Gullible "It will not rain this week" and then later "It might rain on Tuesday".
3. What happens during backtracking
The  solution  to  Lewis's  problem  suggested  above  hangs  heavily  on  what  happens  during
backtracking. It is the process of backtracking, not the illocutionary contribution of a permissive,
that expands the sphere of permissibility.  To fully answer Lewis's challenge we must explain
how this process works.
At a first approximation, the process is something like this. 1. (Rewinding) We find a previous
state of the conversation to rewind to, in which the conversational contribution that failed could
be uttered without failing. 2. (Reasserting) We update the conversational state in the way that we
normally would if the failed conversational contribution had been uttered in that state. The result
of doing this is the new state of the conversation.
In a case of simple retraction this will suffice. Suppose Authority says “It will rain each day this
week” and then  says  “On second thoughts,  no  it  won't.”  The obvious  previous  state  of  the
conversation is  the one just  before Authority spoke for the first  time.  In that  state,  it  is  not
presupposed that it will rain each day. The new state of the conversation is the result of updating
that state in the same way that we would if Authority had uttered his second contribution in that
state. This gives us a conversational state in which it is presupposed that it will not rain on some
day (and not presupposed that it will rain on any day – assuming that this was not presupposed
before Authority spoke for the first time).
There are however, two difficulties in applying this recipe to more complicated cases. First, we
need to  know which  previous  state  should  we backtrack  to,  as  it  won't  always  be  obvious.
Second, in some cases the recipe leads to a state in which implausibly little is presupposed. I
tackle these in turn.
Finding the right past state to rewind to
The simple retraction case is easy because rewinding the conversation by only a single step will
reach a state in which the failed contribution would not fail. What if that's not the case? Perhaps
we should  rewind the conversation,  step by step,  until  we reach a point at  which  the failed
contribution wouldn't fail. There are two problems with this. First, it's impractical: participants
won't remember the previous states of the conversation well enough. Second, it might not rewind
far enough. Suppose that two detectives are having a conversation about a murder case in the
course of which they assert first that A's alibi is sound; second that B's alibi is sound; and third
that either A or B must have committed the murder. The third of these assertions will fail, and
according to the current proposal, the conversational state must rewind to the point at which it is
presupposed that A's alibi is sound, but not that B's is. That is surely an irrational procedure: one
of the alibis must be unsound but there is no good reason to suppose that it is B's rather than A's.
What the detectives ought to do is reconsider every suspect's alibi, in the face of their evidence
that one must be unsound. They should rewind to a point before it was asserted that A's alibi is
sound.
We should not be too surprised that there is no easy way to finding the correct point to rewind to.
If there were, it would be easy to come up with a procedure for updating conversational state as
the illocutionary effect of a permissive, and Lewis has shown that that is not the case.1 Instead,
conversants must muddle by as best they can, and there are several heuristics that we can and do
use.
1. Retraction. When a speaker explicitly retracts something they've said,  they flag the fact
that they want to rewind to the point just before the contribution they want to retract.
Saying  things  like  “on  second  thoughts,...”  or  “I  didn't  to  say  that...”  can  flag  this
intention, and help the other participants to coordinate on a position to rewind to.
2. Supposing. There are a whole host of ways that we can flag a position in a conversation
as  a  suitable  point  to  rewind to,  should a  later  contribution  fail.  “Suppose...”  and its
analogues often do this.
3. Negotiation.  If neither of the above are possible, sometimes we just have to rewind the
conversation  “far  enough”  or  even  right  back  to  the  beginning,  and  then  explicitly
reassert statements that had previously been presupposed.
Too little presupposed?
Suppose that Authority says “It will rain each day this week” and then says “On second thoughts,
it won't rain on Tuesday”. There is no problem here finding the past state to rewind to – it is the
state  of  the  conversation  before  Authority  spoke  for  the  first  time.  If  we  now  update  the
1 Such a procedure would be a variant on Lewis's “Answer 5”, in which the sphere of permissibility is replaced by
a sequence of commands, in this case the commands that have taken place so far in the conversation in the order
in which they occurred. The effect of a permissive would be to “strike out” the shortest subsequence of 
commands starting from the end of the sequence, such that the permissive is consistent with the remaining 
commands. Lewis could reply to such an answer with a variant on the arguments given in the text.
conversation state in the way we would if Authority had uttered his second contribution in the
rewind state, we end up with a conversational state in which it is presupposed that it won't rain
on Tuesday, and in which nothing is presupposed about the weather on other days of the week.
This is wrong! Intuitively, Authority's second utterance didn't fully retract his first: the state after
backtracking should be one in which it is presupposed that it will rain on the days this week other
than Tuesday.
Lewis's examples also easily generate cases of this kind. Suppose that Master says “Spend every
day working!” and then “On second thoughts, have Tuesday off.” If we follow the recipe above
we get the result that Slave is permitted not to work on, say, Wednesday (supposing that that was
permitted before Master's first utterance).
It is tempting to suppose that what we need here is a theory of “partial retraction” – a procedure
that, taking as input the content of Authority's (or Master's) first and second utterances, gives as
output the content still presupposed after the first utterance has been partially retracted. Any such
procedure, however, would be subject to Lewis's objections, so it may seem we have made no
progress.
The right solution, however, is to resist this temptation. Authority's (and Master's) first utterances
have been fully retracted. How then, does it become presupposed that it will rain on days other
than Tuesday (/commanded that Slave is to work on days other than Tuesday)? My suggestion is
that these are Gricean conversational implicatures of Authority's (/Master's) second utterance.
Suppose that Authority had changed his mind, not just about whether it would rain on Tuesday,
but about whether it would rain on any day of the week. He could have said sincerely said “On
second thoughts, it will not rain on any day of the week” or “On second thoughts, it might not
rain on any day of the week”, both of which would have conveyed more, and equally relevant,
information.  From  this,  together  with  Grices'  Maxim  of  Quantity,  Gullible  can  infer  that
Authority has not changed his mind. So it is a conversational implicature of Authority's second
contribution that it will rain on days other than Tuesday, and this duly becomes presupposed as
part of the reassertion step of backtracking.
The situation is similar for Master and Slave...
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